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MEASURING DAMAGES IN SUITABILITY AND
CHURNING ACTIONS UNDER RULE 10b-5
Both the churning of a customer's account and the purchasing of unsuitable securi-
ties' by a broker violate section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the
Exchange Act)2 and Rule 106-5 promulgated pursuant to that statute. 3 Churning occurs
when a broker' who exercises control over a customer's account, engages in excessive
trading for the purpose of realizing increased commissions.' Suitability violations occur
when a broker purchases securities for a customer's account t hat are inconsistent with the
customer's objectives and financial needs.' Under Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and
Rule 101)-5, a customer may sue a broker who has churned his account or who has
purchased unsuitable securities for the account to the customers detriment. Neither
Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act nor Rule 10b-5 specifies how damages in a churning or
suitability suit should be calculated.' Section 28(a) of the Exchange Act, however, limits a
plaintiff's recovery in suits for its violation to actual dantages. 8 Given this statutory
limitation, the measure of damages used in churning and suitability actions 8 should have
' Although this note uses the term securities, it applies to options transactions as well. The legal
standard governing claims of churning or unsuitability under Rule 106-5 is the same for options
trading and other types of securities trading. Smith v. Sade & Co., [1982 Tr. Binder] FED. SEC. L.
REP. (CCH) 11 98,846 at 94,366 (D.D.C. October 27, 1982); § 3(10) of the Exchange Act.
2 15 U.S.C.	 78j(b) (1982).
• 3 The rule provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or instrumentality
of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any national securities exchange:
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary
in order to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which they were made, not
misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates as fraud or deceit upon
any person, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
17 C.F.R.	 240.1013-5 (1983).
• Throughout this note, the term "broker" will be used rather than "registered representative,"
"dealer," or "broker-dealer". This shorthand is meant to include all of these categories.
5 Churning occurs when a broker, exercising control over an account, initiates transactions that
are excessive in light of the character of the account, in order to increase his own personal gain.
Carras v. Burns, 516 F.2d 251, '258 (4th Cir. 1975). High turnover in the customer's account and
large brokerage commissions are the hallmarks of churning. Id. Churning is a deceptive device made
actionable under Rule 106-5. Id. See also Fey v. Walston & Co., 493 F.2d 1036, 1050 (7th Cir. 1974);
Note, Churning- By Securities Dealers, 80 H A RV. L. REV. 869, 869 (1967)[hereinafter cited as Churning].
6 See Clark v. John Lamula Inv., Inc., 583 F.2d 594, 599-600 (2d Cir. 1978); Zaretsky v. E.F.
Hutton & Co., Inc., 509 F. Stipp. 68, 75 (S,D.N.Y. 1981).
▪See 15 U.S.C. § 78a et seq. (1982). One commentator has noted: "The basic problem with
computing damages under Rule 10b-5 is that one is dealing with an implied remedy, under a rule
which was drafted to provide a basis for injunctive relief." Mullaney, Theories of Measuring Damages in
Security Gases and the Effects of Damages on Liability, 46 FORD HAM L. REV. 277, 279 (1977).
8 Section 28(a) of the Exchange Act, in relevant part, provides: "[N]° person permitted to
maintain :t suit for damages under the provisions of this chapter shall recover, through satisfaction of
judgment on one or more actions, a total amount in excess of his actual damages on account of the act
complained of." 15 U.S.C. 786b(a) (1982). Thus, the damages formula used "cannot restore a
plaintiff to a better position than he would have been in if the fraud had not occurred." Rolf v. Blyth,
Eastman Dillon & Co., Inc., 637 F.2d 77, 85 (2d Cir. 1980). [hereinafter, "Roll' 1V1
• Few actions under Rule 10b-5 go to judgment. See Mullaney, supra note 7, at 277-78.
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the effect of placing the defrauded plaintiff in the same position that he or she would
have occupied absent the fraud.'"
Actual damages in churning and suitability cases are difficult to measure." In theory,
actual damages consist of the difference between the value the plaintiff's account would
have had, had it been properly managed, and the value of the fraudulently mismanaged
account." Courts determining damages in suitability and churning cases, therefore, face
the difficult (ask of determining the theoretical value of the well-managed account and of
compensating the plaintiff accordingly. '
Two basic models have emerged for calculating damages in churning and suitability
cases. The quasi-contractual or restitutionary model" is used primarily in churning
cases. 15 Under this model, the measure of damages is the amount of commissions and
interest paid by the customer to the brokerage house." The out of pocket or rescissory
model" is used generally in suitability cases.'" Damages awarded under this model consist
of the amount of the customer's trading losses attributable to the fraud."' A third model,
'" Arrington v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 651 F.2d 615, 621 (9th Cir. 1981).
Several general rules govern the plaintiff's recovery under Rule 10h-5. The district court is to
determine the "appropriate" measure of damages in light of the facts presented. Mackie v. Barrack,
524 F.2d 891, 909 (91h Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S, 816 (1976). The court's function, therefore, is
"to fashion the remedy best suited to the harm." Garnatz v. Stifel, Nicolaus & Co., Inc., 559 F.2d
1357, 1360 (8th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 951 (1978). Moreover, there must he a causal nexus
between the defendant's acts and the plaintiff's loss. See Shores v. Sklar, 610 F.2d 235, 239 (5th Cir.
1980) (causation is an "essential element of recovery").
" In actions where liability has been found on a churning or suitability claim, no consistent
measure of damages has evolved. Various commentators have noted the unsettled nature of the law
on damages under Rule 106-5. See generally, Rath, Damages in BrokerlCustomer Suits. 15 Rev. SEC. REG.
855 (1982); Brodsky, Measuring Damages in Churning and Suitability Cases, 6 SEC. REG. L.J. 157 (1978);
Mullaney, supra note 7; Jacobs, The Measure of Damages in Rule 10b-5 Gases, 65 CEO. L. J. 1093 (1977);
Note, Rule I Ob
-5 Damage Computation: Application of Financial Theory to Determine Net Economic Lass, 51
FottnnAm L. REV. 838 (1983).
" Miley v. Oppenheimer Sc Co.,637 F.2d 318, 327 (5th Cir. 1981). See also Churning,supra note 5,
at 883.
" Some of the variables inherent in determining the value of a well managed account have been
listed by one commentator. See Brodsky, supra note 11, at 158-59.
" See, e.g., Hecht V. Harris, Upham & Co., 430 F.2d 1202, 1211-12 (9th Cir. 1970); Kravitz v.
Pressman, Frohlich & Frost, Inc., 447 F. Stipp. 203, 216 (D. Mass. 1978); Stevens v. Abbott, Proctor &
Paine, 288 F. Supp. 836, 849-50 (E.D. Va. 1968).
15 See Zaretsky v. E.F. Hutton & Co., Inc., 509 F. Supp. 68, 73 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); see also, cases
cited supra note 14.
fi ,See infra notes 32-33 and accompanying text. This measure of recovery is analogous to the
remedy of restitution in contract law, where the measure of damages consists of the benefits
conferred on a party who has been unjustly enriched at the expense of another. See Restatement of
Restitution 1 (1937); 3 L. Loss, SECURITY REGULATION 1794 (2d ed. 1961).
11 See, e.g., Nye v. Blyth, Eastman Dillon & Co., Inc., 588 F.2d 1189, 1198 (8th Cir. 1978);
Henricksen v. Henricksen, 640 F.2d 880, 886-87 (7th Cir. 1981).
See, e.g., Clark v. John Lamula Investors, Inc., 583 F.2d 594, 603 (2d Cir. 1978) and cases cited
supra note 17. Different models have been used for churning and suitability claims because the
damages caused by the violations often vary. If securities suitable Mr the customer's account are
churned, the damages consist only of the commissions and interest paid. On the other hand, where
unsuitable securities are purchased, trading losses are caused by the fraud. See Brodsky, supra note
11, at 159.
' 1' See infra notes 55-62 and accompanying text. The pure out of pocket measure of recovery
consists of the difference between the acquisition cost of a security or securities which the defendant
fraudulently induced the plaintiff' to purchase and the amount the plaintiff subsequently received
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the loss of the bargain model, where the plaintiff recovers the profits he or she would
have earned on the money had the account not been fraudulently mismanaged, has
sometimes been suggested by commentators, but has rarely been adopted by courts. 2"
Customers who allege that their accounts have been fraudulently mismanaged by
their brokers often claim both that the brokers churned the account and purchased
unsuitable securities. Where liability has been found on both churning and suitability
claims, no single model has been adopted to calculate the plaintiff's damages. In some
cases the quasi-contractual model is used," while in others the out of pocket Model . is
deemed appropriate." Often courts combine the two models, thereby awarding the
plaintiff both his trading losses and the amount of commissions and interest paid to the
brokerage house."
The first part of this note will examine the traditional models of recovery used by
courts in churning and suitability cases. The note suggests that neither the quasi-contrac-
tual model nor the out of pocket model accurately measures a customer's actual damages
and, thus, that neither model is appropriate for use in suits between brokers and custom-
ers. This note submits that the quasi-contractual model is inappropriate because it bases
recovery only upon the amount of commissions and interest paid. The potential for
overcompensating the plaintiff exists with use of the quasi-contractual model when there
are no trading losses in the account. The potential for undercompensating the plaintiff
exists when the trading losses exceed the commissions and interest paid. The out of
pocket model is similarly flawed because recovery under this model consists of the
plaintiff's total amount of trading losses without. regard for general market decline or
other extrinsic factors which affect the value of the account. The combination method of
calculating damages is an inappropriate measure because awarding both commissions
paid and trading losses, which encompass some measure of the commissions paid,'"
when he or she sold the securities. See Nye v. Blyth, Eastman Dillon & Co., Inc., 588 F.2d 1189, 1198
(8th Cir. 1978). The difference between the acquisition cost of a security and the amount received
when the security is sold constitutes the trading profit or loss on the transaction. Trading losses in an
account, therefore, consist of the aggregate of *the trading profits and losses on the individual
securities in the account. The trading losses in the account represent the out of pocket damages the
plaintiff has suffered. See Churning, .mpra note 5, at 884-85.
'" In Steven v. Abbot., Proctor & Paine, 288 F. Supp. 836, 849 (E.D. Va. 1968), the court
dismissed the benefit of the bargain theory as being too speculative in nature, as ignoring the
economic reality that properly managed accounts can lose money, arid as awarding punitive damages
in the guise of compensatory damages. Id. Use of the benefit of the bargain model, however, has been
approved where defrauded sellers of securities were not paid the agreed upon price for the
securities. Osofsky v. Sipf, 645 F.2d 107, 113 (2d Cir. 1981). The court in °sip°, explained that in
this situation the amount of damages could readily be determined because it represented the unpaid
consideration and thus was not unduly speculative. Id.
2 ' See, e.g., Kravitz v. Pressman, Frohlich & Frost, 447 F. Supp. 203, 216 (D. Mass. 1978).
" See, e.g., Nye v. Blyth, Eastman Dillon & Co., Inc., 588 F.2d 1189, 1198 (8th Cir. 1978).
" See, e.g., Henricksen v. Henricksen, 640 F.2d 880, 884, 887 (7th Cir. 1981),
24 Trading losses consist of the difference between the acquisition cost of a security and the
amount received when the security is subsequently sold. Brokerage firms charge a commission on all
purchases and sales they execute. The commission is automatically added to the acquisition cost or a
security and is automatically subtracted from the amount received when the security is subsequently
sold. See B. CUP., THE BASICS OF INVESTING 141-42 (1979) (example or securit y transaction confirma-
tion showing that commission is automatically added to the price of the security). For example, if the
customer purchases a security with a purchase price of $200 and the brokerage firm charges a 5%
commission for purchases and sales made cm the customer's behalf, the acquisition cost of the
security is $210. If the customer subsequently sells the security for a price of' $100, the amount
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overcompensates the plaintiff. The second part of the note will examine recent trends in
measuring damages in churning and suitability cases, including the modified out of
pocket approaches used recently in some circuits. Finally, the third part of the note will
discuss the weaknesses of the various modified out. of pocket models. Although the
various models of recovery have been criticized by some commentators, no commentator
has proposed a model which overcomes all of the defects of the prior models. This note
will propose a model designed to overcome the defects in the prior models and to
compensate fully, without overcompensating, the defrauded plaintiff. The proposed
model takes into account all of the factors that can influence the value of an account,
including market action, dividend activity, trading losses, and cash withdrawals and
deposits made by the plaintiff.
1. TRADMONAL APPROACHES TO MEASURING DAMAGES
Traditionally, damages in a churning case have been determined by the use of the
quasi-contractual model of recovery, whereas damages in a suitability case have been
determined by the use of the out of pocket model. 23 The basis for using different models
in each case is related to the element of causation. The harm caused by the churning of
suitable securities consists of the increased commissions, interest and taxes generated by
the increased activity in the account:26 The injury caused by the purchase of unsuitable
securities consists of the trading losses sustained by the purchase and sale of the unsuita 7
ble securities." Most often, however, the plaintiff customer alleges that the broker both
churned the account and purchased unsuitable securities. 28 When the plaintiff prevails on
both causes of action, neither model of recovery alone is sufficient to compensate the
plaintiff fully for the harm caused by the broker." Although recent cases have recognized
the limitations of the traditional models of recovery and have developed modified models,
it is necessary to understand the traditional models in order to appreciate the impact of
these modifications. The traditional models of" recovery not only continue to he consid-
ered as viable methods of calculating damages," but also serve as the foundation for the
modified approaches. 31 This section will discuss the Iwo traditional models of calculating
damages and will examine the weaknesses inherent in each that precipitated the various
judicial attempts at modification.
received by the customer would he $95. The trading loss on the transactiOri is $115. Trading losses,
therefore, include the commissions paid on the transaction.
" See cases cited supra notes 15 and 18.
26
 Brodsky, supra note 11, at 159-60.
27 Id.
28
 See, e.g., Hecht v. Harris, Upham & Co., 430 F.2d 1202, 1206 (9th Cir. 1970); Fey v. Walston
& Co., Inc., 493 F.2d 1036, 1041 (7th Cir. 1974); Miley v. Oppenheimer & Co., Inc., 637 F.2d 318,
325 (5th Cir. 1981); Rolf v. Blyth, Eastman Dillon & Co., Inc., 570 F.2d 38, 43 (2d Cir. 1978), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 1039 (1978), award on remand appealed, 637 F.2d 77 (2d Cir. 1980) [hereinafter died
as Rolf II].
21' Miley v. Oppenheimer & Co., Inc., 637 F.2d 318, 326 (5th Cir. 1981).
30 See, e.g., Garnatz v. Stifel, Nicolaus & Co., Inc., 559 F.2d 1357, 1361 (8th Cir. 1977) (out of
pocket model); Zaretsky v. E.F. Hutton & Co., Inc., 509 F. Supp. 68, 73 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (quasi-con-
tractual model); Kravitz v. Pressman, Frohlich & Frost, Inc., 447 F. Supp. 203, 216 (D. Mass. 1978)
(quasi-contractual model).
"I See Miley, supra note 28, at 327-28, discussed itifra notes 139-56 and accompanying text.
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A. The Quasi-Contractual Model: Simplicity Over Accuracy
Under the quasi-contractual model of recovery, the court allows the plaintiff cus-
tomer to recover from the defendant broker or brokerage house the commissions paid,
interest charged, and any fees and taxes paid on the securities transactions. 32 This theory
of recovery is analytically consistent with the tort claim of unjust enrichment in that it
requires the broker to return to the customer the benefits derived from the broker's
unlawful act S. 33
The quasi-contractual model of recovery has been used by courts for various reasons.
Courts frequently reason that damages are ascertained most easily by using this method
and that other models of recovery are too difficult to apply because those models depend
on unduly speculative calculations.' Some courts have reasoned that the quasi-contrac-
tual model provides the most accurate measure of the plaintiff's damages and that the out
of pocket and benefit of the bargain models of recovery overstate the plaintiff's loss." Still
others have reasoned that the quasi-contractual model is preferable because other models
understate the plaintiff's loss." One court even stated that commissions represent the
only element of damages proximately caused by the fraudulent acts of the broker. 37
Some courts have reasoned that the quasi-contractual model of recovery is appropri-
ate in situations where it is impossible to know what the value of the securities in the
account would have been but for the defendant's fraud." This reasoning is, however,
little more than a rationalization. Any determination of damages entails a comparison
between the theoretical value of the account had there been no fraud and the actual value
of the fraudulently managed account. It is, therefore, almost always impossible to know
with certainty what securities would have been in the account had there been no fraud. 39
This rationalization merely indicates that, as opposed to models which include the
difficult and speculative calculation of the value of a theoretical, well-managed account,
the quasi-contractual model results in an easily ascertainable damages award. The weak-
ness of the quasi-contractual model of recovery, as one commentator has noted, is that,
IS See, e.g., Hecht v. Harris, Upham & Co., 430 F.2d 1202, 1211-12 (9th Cir. 1970); Zaretsky v.
E.F. Hutton & Co., Inc., 509 F. Supp. 68, 73 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); Kravitz v. Pressman, Frohlich & Frost,
Inc., 447 F. Supp. 203, 216 (D. Mass. 1978).
33 Cf: Speed v. Transamerica Corp., 135 F. Supt.), 176, 186 (D. Del. 1955) modified on other grounds
and affd, 235 F.2d 369 (3rd Cir. 1956) ("The injured party is entitled to require the perpetrator to
disgorge gains made at the expense of the injured.").
Carras v. Burns, 516 F.2d 251,259 (4th Cir. 1975); see also Zaretsky v. E.F. Hutton & Co., Inc.,
509 F. Supp. at 73. In determining that the quasi-contractual model of recovery was appropriate, the
Carras court noted: "Here, however, it is not possible to determine what the account would have been
worth had there been no churning . . . . On the facts of this case, damages for churning should be
limited to the ascertainable losses to the account, including commissions, service charges, and taxes
attributable to trading." 516 F.2d at 259.
35 E.g., Stevens v. Abbot, Proctor & Paine, 288 F. Supp. 836, 849-50 (E.D. Va. 1968).
" See Kravitz v. Pressman, Frohlich & Frost, Inc., 447 F. Supp. 203, 216 (D. Mass. 1978).
37 Newkirk v. Hayden, Stone & Co., [1964-1966 Transfer BinderifEn. SEC:. L. REP. (CCH) 11
91,621, at 95,321-22 (S.D. Cal. September 30, 1965). The Newkirk court also indicated that awarding
damages based on adverse fluctuations in the stock would be punitive rather than deterrent "because
defendants did not gain from market losses." Id. at 95,321. Punitive damages are not recoverable
under the federal securities laws. E.g., Byrnes v. Faulkner, Dawkins & Sullivan, 550 F.2d 1303, 1313
(2d Cir. 1977).
" Zaretsky v. E.F. Hutton & Co., Inc., 509 F. Supp. 68, 73 (S.D.N.Y. 1981). See also, Carras v.
Burns, 516 F.2d 251, 259 (4th Cir. 1975).
3" See Churning, supra note 5, at 883.
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for all its simplicity, it often bears no relationship to the amount of the customer's actual
damages. 4" If the value of the commissions paid as a result of the churning were the only
damages suffered by the plaintiff, the theoretical amount of damages should be the
difference bet ween the commissions actually paid and (hose which would have been paid
had the account been properly managed, rather than the total amount of commissions
paid." Consequently, an award of the full amount of commissions paid in a churning suit
may overcompensate the plaintiff. 42
Other justifications given for the use of the quasi-contractual model arc similarly
flawed. For example, the rationale that other models do not adequately compensate the
plaintiff' could only possibly be valid when the amount of commissions paid exceeds the
trading losses in the account. 43 If the trading losses in the account are greater than the
commissions paid, the use of the out of pocket model would result in a larger damages
award for the plaintiff. Moreover, even when I he commissions paid exceed the trading
losses, if the broker's fraudulent conduct caused both the trading losses and the excess
commissions," t he quasi-contractual model would undercompensate the plaintiff because
it does not include compensation for trading losses.°
The rationale that the quasi-contractual model should he used because other models
of recovery overstate the plaintiff's loss" is similarly' unconvincing. If the market value of'
the plaintiff's portfolio increased more than the market in general because of the broker's
fraudulent trading, that is, if the plaintiff made money because of the increased trading in
the account, the award of commissions would overstate the plaintiff's loss. The plaintiff
would receive a windfall because he would retain the benefit of the increased trading
activity in the form of greater profits or reduced losses in the account without having to
incur any of the costs associated with that activity.
The total harm caused by the defendant broker's violations of the securities laws can
include both excess commissions and trading losses." A plaintiff customer is entitled to
4" Id. at 884.
41 Cf. Lutz v. Boas, 39 Del. Ch. 585,600-01, 171 A.2d 381, 391 (1961). To determine damages in
such a manner, would, of course, negate the ;tclvantage of the easily ascertainable feature that is
commonly associated with the quasi-contractual model of recovery. Determining the amount of
commissions that would have been paid if the account were properly managed is as difficult as
determining the value of the entire account in the absence of fraud.
" One justification given for the award of the full amount of commissions paid is that since the
damages were caused by defendant's conduct, it is reasonable to hold that the broker loses the right
to retain any benefit received from his conduct. Churning,supra note 5, at 884. Cf. Gratz v. Claughton,
187 F.2d 46, 51-52 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 920 (1951); Hecht v. Harris, Upham & Co., 430
F.2d 1202, 1213 (9th Cir. 1970) (Powell, J., dissenting in part).
43 The quasi-contractual method of recovery allows the plaintiff to collect damages even though
the account made a profit during the period of the violation. Zaretsky v. E.F. Hutton & Co., I nc., 509
F. Supp. 68, 73 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
" It is not always true that the only element or damages proximately caused by defendant's
churning is the amount of commissions paid. As the Fifth Circuit noted: "While excessive commis-
sions represent the sole source of gain to the broker from his misconduct, there are in fact two
distinct harms (excess commissions and decline in portfolio value) which may be proximately caused
by the broker's churning of an account." Miley v. Oppenheimer & Co., Inc., 637 F.2d 318, 326 (5th
Cir. 1981).
45 Id.
" See, e.g., Stevens v. Abbott, Proctor & Paine, 288 F. Supp. 836, 849-50 (E.D. Va. 1968).
17 Miley v. Oppenheimer & Co., Inc., 637 F.2d at 326.
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recover all of the actual damages proximately caused by the defendant's wrongdoing."
Any model of recovery used to determine compensation for plaintiffs in cases of fraud
should focus, not on what the broker or brokerage house earned as a result of the fraud
— as the quasi-contractual model does — but rather on the extent of damage to the
Customer. Although the quasi-contractual model is easy to apply, it does not accurately
measure the plaintiff's actual damages because it concentrates on the amounts earned by
the broker rather than the damage to the customer,
B. The Out of Pocket Model: Defendant as Market Insurer
Unlike the quasi-contractual model, the out of pocket or rescissory model of calculat-
ing a plaintiff's damages focuses on the economic harm done to the plaintiff customer
rather than the benefit received by the defendant broker." This model is used more often
in suits challenging the suitability of the investment decisions made by the broker than in
pure churning suits. 50 Where the suitability of a purchase is challenged, the customer is
claiming that the security should not have been purchased. 5 ' Logically, therefore, dam-
ages caused by suitability violations are not limited to commissions and interest paid, but
rather consist of the total trading losses sustained on account of the unsuitable pur-
chases." Damages under the out of pocket model of recovery, however, consist of the
total decline in the value of plaintiff's account during the period of' the fraud rather than
only the trading losses caused by the unsuitable purchases. 53 This model places the
customer in the position he occupied prior to the time the fraud commenced.'
Under the out of pocket model, damages are calculated by computing the difference
between the value of the plaintiff's original portfolio and the value of the portfolio at the
time the fraud was, or should have been," discovered. 56 The original value of the
" Fey v. Walston & Co., Inc., 493 F.2d 1036, 1055 n.26 (7th Cir. 1974)("damages should
compensate the customer by fair approximation for the losses sustained as a proximate result of
unlawful churning.").
" For a discussion of the out of pocket model generally, see Mullaney, supra note 7, at 281-83;
Churning, supra note 5, at 884-85.
50 See cases cited ,supra note 18.
5 ' See, e.g., Clark v. John Lamula Investors, Inc., 583 F.2d 594, 599-600 (2d Cir. 1978); Garnatz
v. Stifel, Nicolaus & Co., Inc., 559 F.2d 1357, 1360 (8th Cir. 1977).
52 Brodsky, supra note 11, at 159.
" Garnatz v. Stifel, Nicolaus & Co., Inc., 559 F.2d 1357, 1361 (8th Cir. 1977); see also Clark v.
John Lamula Investors, Inc., 585 F.2d 594, 604 (2d Cir. 1978). CI Reeder v. Mastereraft Elec. Corp.,
363 F. Supp. 574, 582 (S.D.N.Y. 1973). In cases of a defrauded purchaser who bought securities at an
artificially high price due to the defendant's fraud, the out of' pocket model gives plaintiff the
difference between the price paid and the actual value at the date of sale. Estate Counseling Service,
Inc. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 303 F.2d 527, 533 (10th Cir. 1962). In the context
of a defrauded purchaser who is suing the issuer or seller rather than the broker, unlike in the
context of suits between brokers and customers, the out of pocket model is not synonomous with the
rescisory model. Id.
" Garnatz v. Stifel, Nicolaus & Co., Inc., 559 F.2d 1357, 1361 (8th Cir. 1977)("Such a measure
seeks to return the parties to the status quo ante the sale.").
55 Courts have consistently held that damages are determined only until the time the plaintiff
discovers, or reasonably should have discovered the fraud. Arrington v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner & Smith, lnc., 651 F.2d 615, 620 (9th Cir. 1981); Nye v. Blyth, Eastman Dillon & Co., Inc.,
588 F.2d 1189, 1198 (8th Cir. 1978); Foster v. Financial Technology :, Inc., 517 F.2d 1068, 1072 (9th
Cir. 1975). As the court in Arrington stated, "Plaintiffs' damages in a 10b-5 case are limited by what
they would have realized had they acted to preserve their assets or rights when they first learned of
the fraud or had reason to know of it." 651 F.2d at 620.
" Jacobs, The Measure of Damages in Rule 10h-5 Cases, 65 GEO. L.J. 1093, 1138 (1977).
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portfolio is based on the aggregate of the market prices of the securities contained in the
account (minus any debit balance) at the time the fraud commenced" or, where the fraud
commenced upon the opening of the plaintiff's account, by the amount of the plaintiff's
original investment." Similarly, the value of the portfolio at the time the fraud is discov-
ered is based on either the aggregate of the market prices of the securities in the
account," or, where the plaintiff closes the account upon learning of the fraud, the
amount. of cash returned to the plaintiff." If only one security is involved, the plaintiff's
total out of pocket loss is computed by taking the difference between the amount paid for
the security by the customer and the amount that would have been credited to the
customer had the security been sold at the time the fraud was discovered." Thus, the
damages recovered using the out of pocket model consist not of the plaintiff's realized
losses but of the tosses the plaintiff would have sustained had he sold when he discovered
the fraud."
The out of pocket model assumes that none of the transactions in the account were
proper," or, where only one security is involved, that no other security would have been
purchased." The assumptions on which this model is based ignore the fact that the
plaintiff engaged the services of a brokerage house to enter into securities transactions on
his behalf." As a result, the out of pocket model often overstates the plaintiff's actual
damages. For example, in Clark v. John Lamula Investors, Ine., 66
 the Second Circuit.
affirmed the trial court's damage award of the total amount of trading losses suffered by
the plaintiff, even though the securities were sold at the bottom of a bear market." The
appellate court rejected the defendant's argument that the damages should he reduced to
reflect the general decline the market was experiencing at that time." In so doing, the
court distinguished the situation where the entire account was mismanaged from a
57 See Rolf v. Blyth, Eastman Dillon & Co., Inc., [1979 Tr. Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
96,919, at 95,856 (S.D.N.V. 1979)("Rolf III").
58 See, e.g., Hecht v. Harris, Upham	 Co., 430 F.2d 1202, 1206 (9th Cir. 1970).
" See, e.g., Rolf II, 570 F.2d at 49.
" See, e.g., Miley v. Oppenheimer & Co„ 637 F.2d 318, 327 (5th Cir. 1981).
41 See, e.g., Clark v. John Lamula Investors, Inc., 583 F.2d 594, 603-04 (2d Cir. 1978).
In Costello v. Oppenheimer & Co., Inc., 711 F.2d 1361 (7th Cir. 1983), the district court had
instructed the jury that the elements of' damages which could have resulted from the wrongful
conduct of the defendant were the realized losses to the account and commissions on improper
transactions. Id. at 1373. The appellate court did not consider the appropriateness of this charge
since it was not objected to at trial. Id. This view that plaintiff may only recover realized losses is
erroneous. Plaintiffs are entitled to recover the losses they would have realized had they sold upon
learning of the fraud. See Arrington v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 651 F.2d 615,
620 (9th Cir. 1981); C.7: Nye v. Blyth, Eastman Dillon & Co., 588 F.2d 1189, 1198 (8th Cir. 1978).
63 Churning, supra note 5, at 884.
64 Id_
6' Upon entering the securities market, an investor assumes the risks inherent in that market
and must bear the losses stemming therefrom. See Huddleston v. Herman & Maclean, 640 F.2d 534,
555 (5th Cir. 1981), aff'd in part, rev'd in part on other grounds, 103 S. Ct. 683 (1983). As the court in
Stevens v. Abbott, Proctor & Paine, 288 F. Stipp. 836, 850 (E.D. Va. 1968) stated, to ignore this reality
"would be to ignore the fact that regardless of how unsophisticated and financially naive the plaintiff
was, she is hound to have known that one who deals in the stock market, regardless of in how
conservative a manner, stands not only the chance to have her securities appreciate in value, but
likewise stands the chance that some may depreciate."
" 583 F.2d 594 (2c1 Cir. 1978).
Id. at 599, 604.
68 Id. at 603-04.
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situation where the plaintiff was induced to buy one particular unsuitable security." The
court reasoned that where the entire account has been mismanaged and there is evidence
that even a properly managed account would have declined in value because of market
conditions, an offset in damages might be appropriate.'" Where only one security is
involved, however, the court reasoned that the defendants should not be permitted to
avoid making the plaintiff whole merely because the plaintiff sold the unsuitable security
at the bottom of a bear market. 7 '
The distinction between fraud in connection with the entire account and fraud in
connection with one security is without merit. In Clark, the plaintiff had engaged the
services of the defendant brokerage house because she desired to invest $100,000 and to
obtain a $1,000 per month return on her investment." An acquisition of some security or
securities, therefore, was appropriate. Indeed, an acquisition was demanded by the
plaintiff." Although the plaintiff in Clark lost money due to the purchase of unsuitiable
securities, the plaintiff would probably have lost money even on securities which were
suitable to her needs if she chose to sell them at the bottom of a hear market." By
awarding the plaintiff her entire loss on the transaction and ignoring market realities, the
court allowed the plaintiff to escape the risks inherent in investing during a declining
market. The court's use of the out of pocket model in Clark in effect made the defendant a
market insurer and granted a windfall to the plaintiff. The result in Clark illustrates a
potential problem with the use of the out of pocket model — the model overcompensates
the plaintiff in situations where even a well-managed account would have lost money.
Another flaw in the pure out of pocket model of recovery is that use of this model
results in no recovery to the plaintiff in situations where the plaintiff's account does not
decline in value. In this situation, the plaintiff would receive no damages even though he
or she paid commissions on unsuitable transactions and, if the account were a margin
account," also paid interest on the money used to purchase the unsuitable securities. For
example, if the defendant broker fraudulently induced the plaintiff to purchase unsuita-
ble high risk securities which did not decline in value, the plaintiff would suffer no
compensable loss, according to the out of pocket theory.
Dissatisfaction with the injustice of permitting a defendant who had engaged in
unsuitable transactions in violation of the Exchange Act to escape liability has motivated
courts, in situations where there have been no trading losses, to choose the quasi-
contractual model of recovery instead of the out of pocket model.'" By using one model of
recovery when the plaintiff has trading losses and another when the plaintiff has suffered
no such losses, even though each plaintiff has complained of the same wrong, courts have
been inconsistent in their approach to the measurement of damages." As a result, the
" Id. at 604.
70 Id.
° Id,
" Id. at 597.
" Id.
" Plaintiff sold her securities "two days before President Nixon resigned and close to the bottom
of a bear market." Id. at 599.
" "A margin account is a trading account maintained with a brokerage firm on which the
investor may borrow a percentage of the funds for the purchase of securities. The broker loans the
funds at slightly above the prime rate." HIRT AND BLACK, FUNDAMENTALS OF INVESTMENT MANAGE-
MENT AND STRATEGY 481 (1983).
7' See Zaretsky v. E.F. Hutton & Co., Inc. 509 F. Supp. 68, 73 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
47 Compare Zaretsky, 509 F. Supp. at 73 (quasi-contractual measure applied where plaintiff
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defendant broker has the burden of paying total trading losses when those losses exist,
without receiving the benefit of trading gains when such gains exist. To avoid this
inequity, any model of recovery adopted for use in suits between brokers and customers
should apply regardless of whether the plaintiff has made or lost money in the account.
In sum, neither the quasi-contractual model nor the out of pocket model accurately
measures a plaintiff's actual damages in churning and suitability suits. Under the quasi-
contractual model, damages consist of all of the commissions and interest paid by the
plaintiff customer to the defendant broker." The problem with this model of recovery is
that it fails to focus on the harm done to the plaintiff. Rather, it concentrates on the
benefit received by the defendant and, therefore, may bear little relation to the plaintiff's
actual injury. In contrast to the quasi-contractual model, the out of pocket model of
recovery awards the plaintiff the total trading losses sustained in the account,' Recovery,
therefore, is theoretically related to the plaintiff customer's degree of harm. Nevertheless,
this model assumes, often erroneously, that all of the trades in the account were invalid.
In addition, the out of pocket model ignores the effect that market action may have had
on the plaintiff's trading losses. Because the out of pocket model may compensate the
plaintiff for harm not caused by the defendant, use of this model may result in a windfall
to the plaintiff.
II. RECENT TRENDS IN MEASURING DAMAGES: THE MODIFIED RESCISSORY
MODEL OF RECOVERY
Because the traditional quasi-contractual and out of pocket models have proved
unsatisfactory in measuring damages for suitability and churning violations, courts have
shown an increased willingness to develop modified models of recovery. These modified
models incorporate an analysis of general market conditions in an attempt to determine
the plaintiff's actual damages more accurately." A modified rescissory model for calculat-
ing damages, which looks beyond the benefit received by the defendant and the trading
losses sustained by the plaintiff, is becoming increasingly prevalent in both suitability and
churning cases. 8 ' Under this model, "the plaintiff is entitled to recover the difference
between what he would have had if the account had been handled legitimately and what
he in fact had at the time the violation ended." 82 A modified rescissory model was first
suffered no trading losses) with Garnatz, 559 F.2d at 1361 (out of pocket model applied where
plaintiff had suffered trading losses).
78 See cases cited supra note 32.
79 See cases cited supra note 53.
'" E.g., Arrington v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 651 F.2d 615, 622 (9th Cir.
1981); Miley v. Oppenheimer & Co., 637 F.2d 318, 328 (5th Cir. 1981); Rolf IY, 637 F.2d at 84. This
trend of including an analysis of general market conditions in an effort to determine more accurately
plaintiffs' damages is apparent in 10b-5 cases involving frauds other than churning and suitability as
well. See, e.g., Huddleston v. Herman & Maclean, 640 F.2d 534, 555 (5th Cir. 1981)(claim against
issuer of securities for false statements in prospectus), aff'd in part ,re-o'd in part on other grounds, 103 S.
Ct. 683 (1983); Green v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 541 F.2d 1335, 1345 (9th Cir. 1976)(Sneed, J.,
concurring)(misleading financial statements); Beissinger v. Rockwood Computer Corp., 529 F. Supp.
770, 788-89 (E.D. Pa. 1981)(misleading annual report); Bonime v. Doyle, 416 F. Supp. 1372, 1386
(S.D.N.Y. 1976), aff'd mem, , 556 F.2d 554 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, sub non, Sloane v. Bonime, 434 U.S.
924 (1977)(market manipulation); Black v. Riker-Maxson Corp., 401 F. Supp. 693, 700 (S.D.N.Y.
1975)(misrepresentations in connection with a private placement).
SI See, e.g., Arrington v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 651 F.2d 615, 621-22 (9th
Cir. 1981); Miley v. Oppenheimer & Co., 637 F.2d 318, 328 (5th Cir. 1981); Rolf II, 570 F.2d at 49.
62 Miley v. Oppenheimer & Co., Inc., 637 F.2d 318, 327 (5th Cir. 1981).
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developed by the Second Circuit in Rolf v. Blyth, Eastman Dillon & Co., Inc." The Rolf
model awards damages in a manner that more closely approximates the plaintiff's actual
damages than do the quasi-contractual and pure out of pocket models. 84
The objective of the modified rescissory model, as one court has indicated, is to
measure the plaintiff's actual damages and to avoid a damages award that constitutes a
windfall to either the plaintiff or the defendant." Because the modified rescissory model
of recovery has been used by the judiciary only in recent years," however, no single
formula has been uniformly accepted as a representative approach. Instead, various
district and circuit courts, faced with specific factual scenarios, have developed several
formulas designed to suit the particular case before the court.
'Phis section of the note will analyze the modified rescissory approach adopted by the
Second Circuit in Rolf v. Myth, Eastman Dillon & Co." Although the Rolf formula repre-
sents a step forward from the traditional approaches, this note suggests that the Rolf
formula does not adequately measure the plaintiff's actual damages because that formula
counts the commissions and interest components of the plaintiff's damages twice. Mod-
ifications of the Rot/ formula adopted by other circuits will then be discussed. Finally, the
modified rescissory model used by the Ninth Circuit in Arrington v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner & Smith, Inc.," will he presented and analyzed. This note suggests that the
Arrington model, which does not count the commissions and interest components of the
plaintiff's actual damages twice, but does take general market conditions into account, is
an appropriate model of recovery for churning and suitability cases.
A. The Rolf Model
A modified rescissory model of recovery for churning and suitability cases was first
adopted in Roily. Blyth, Eastman Dillon & Co., Inc.' ("Rolf II"), In Rolf," the district court
found that the defendant broker was liable for purchasing securities that were unsuitable
for the plaintiff customer. 9 ' The district court limited damages to the amount of commis-
sions paid, 82 reasoning that. any other amount of damages would be too speculative,"
" 570 F.2d 38 (2c1 Cir. 1978)(Rolf II), further appealed, 637 F.2d 77 (2d Cir. 1980).
" The modified rescissory models attempt to exclude from the damage award those declines in
market forces that are caused by general market forces and that are not related to the fraud. See,e.g.,
Miley v. Oppenheimer & Co., Inc., 637 F.2d 318, 327.28 (5th Cir. 1981); Rolf IV, 637 F.2d at 84.
" See Miley v. Oppenheimer & Co., Inc., 637 F.2d 318, 327-28 (5th Cir. 1981).
" The Second Circuit in Rolf v. Blyth, Eastman Dillon & Co., Inc., 570 F.2d 38 (2d Cir,
1978)(tfo(f //), was the first court to adopt a modified rescissory approach. The approach has been
suggested first by a commentator. Churning, supra note 5, at 885.
"7
 570 F.2d 38 (2d Cir. 1978), further appealed, 637 F.2d 77 (2d Cir. 1980).
" 65l F.2c1 615 (9th Cir. 1981).
99
 570 F.2d 38 (2d Cir. 1978),further appealed, 637 F.2d 77 (2d Cir. 1980).
9° Rolf v. Blyth, Eastman Dillon & Co., Inc., 424 F. Supp. 1021, 1043 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (Ro/f1).
Rolf entrusted a discretionary account to Blyth, Eastman Dillon. 570 F.2d at 41. Although Rolf's
investment goal was to achieve substantial capital gain in an investment program emphasizing
preservation and augmentation of capital, Stott, Rolf's broker, in conjunction with Rolf's investment
advisor, Yamada, purchased highly speculative securities for Rolf's account. Id. at 42-43. In less than
a year, Rolf's account had declined in value from $1,423,000 to $446,000. Id. at 42.
" The district court also based liability on the common law claim of breach of fiduciary duty.
424 F. Supp. at 1039. The district court dismissed the plaintiff's churning claim. Id. at 1040.
82
	courts which use the traditional approaches to the issue of damages award damages
under the out of pocket model in suitability cases. See cases cited supra note 18.
93 424 F. Supp. at 1045.
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On appeal, ("Roll II") the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
reversed the district court's decision on the issue of damages and remanded the case,
ordering that the district court calculate damages in accordance with the following
formula:" First, determine the market value of the plaintiff's portfolio at the time the
defendant's fraud commenced; second, subtract the value of the portfolio at the time the
fraud ceased, to determine "the customer's gross economic loss";"' and finally, reduce the
customer's gross economic loss by the average percentage decline in the value of a
recognized index of market action, 94
 or a combination of such indices, during the period
of the fraud."'
The court of appeals reasoned Rolf's portfolio would have declined in value during
the bear market even in the absence of the defendant's fraud." Failure to adjust the
plaintiff's gross economic loss by the percentage of market decline would therefore put
the plaintiff' in a better position than he would have been in had the fraud not occurred,
the court reasoned." Such a result, the court held, would be inconsistent with the
limitation of actual damages mandated by Section 28(a) of the Securities Exchange Act.'"
The court also held, however, without indicating its reasoning, that the customer was
entitled to interest and the return of commissions paid on transactions within the period
of the fraud.'E
To illustrate the economic effect of this formula, consider the hypothetical case of
Mr. Customer. Assume that Mr. Customer had a portfolio with a market value of
$200,000 when the fraud commenced and that this portfolio had declined in value to
$100,000 by the time the fraud ended. Assume further that Mr. Customer had paid
$25,000 in commissions, $10,000 in interest and had withdrawn $10,000 in cash for his
personal use during this period. Assume also that the general market, as indicated by the
appropriate index, had suffered a 10% decline during the period of the fraud. Under the
Roil 11 formula, Mr. Customer would receive $125,000 in darnages.' 12
The flaws in the Ralf !! formula are apparent from the result reached in the case of
Mr. Customer. Although the intent of the formula was to reduce the plaintiff's gross
economic loss by factoring in market decline so that the plaintiff would recover less than
his full economic loss,"" Mr. Customer, using the Rolf 11 formula, recovered more than his
gross economic loss. The reasons for this result are three-fold. First, the plaintiff is
awarded commissions and interest even though these elements are already rep-
"4 570 F.2d at 49-50.
" Id. at 49.
"Fhe court left it to the district court to select the appropriate market index, or combination of
indices, given the nature of Rolf's account. In addition, the court also indicated that the market
decline could be determined by the use of expert opinion. Id. at 49 n.22.
97 Id. at 49.
" Id. at 49 n.22.
" Id.
MO Id.
L" Id. at 50. The court in Reif II also held that Rolf's damages must he reduced by the amount
he received in settlement of his claims against other defendants. hi. at 49-50. This holding is in
keeping with section 28(a) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 19'34 which limits the amount of
plaintiff's recovery, "in one or more actions" to his or her actual damages. 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(a) (1982),
quoted supra note 8.
102 This figure was calculated as follows: $200,000 (the market value of the port folio at the time
the fraud commenced) minus $100,000 (the value of the portfolio when the fraud was discovered)
minus $10,000 (market decline) plus $25,000 (commissions) plus $10,000 (interest) equals $125,000.
103 See 570 E.2ci at 49.
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resented.'" When a security is purchased, brokerage commissions are automatically
added to the cost of the security. 105 The sum of the purchase price and the commissions
paid represents the acquisition cost of the security to the customer."' The opening value
of the account, therefore, includes the amounts paid in commissions. When a security is
sold, brokerage commissions are automatically subtracted from the sale proceeds.'" The
difference between the sale proceeds and the commissions charged represents the
amount the customer receives when the security is sold.'" The ending value of the
account, therefore, also includes amounts paid as commissions. Similarly, the interest
charged by the brokerage house on margin accounts is automatically added to the
customer's debit balance on a monthly basis."" Because the values of the original and
ending portfolios are determined by subtracting the debit balance from the market value
of the portfolio, interest paid to the brokerage house is also factored into the plaintiff's
gross economic loss in Roy' /1."" Adding commissions and interest charges as separate
components of the damages calculation, therefore, compensates the plaintiff twice for the
same harm suffered."' This result could be avoided by not including commissions and
interest as separate factors in the damages formula or by determining the beginning and
ending values of the portfolio net of commissions and interest and factoring out the
commissions charged on securities transactions that occurred during the period of the
fraud. No evidence that commissions and interest were factored out of the beginning and
ending values of the portfolio was offered in Rolf II. "Z
The second flaw in the Rolf II formula, as comment ators have noted, is that the
percentage decline of the market is derived front t he plaintiff's gross economic loss rather
than from the value of the original port folio." 3 Because market forces operate on the
plaintiff's entire portfolio, the percentage decline should he computed by using the figure
that represents the amount the plaintiff invested in the market. 14 This figure is the value
of the original portfolio, not the gross economic loss figure.
The third flaw in the Rolf II formula is that the defendant is not given credit for cash
withdrawn from the accoant and used for the plaintiff's personal purposes. When a
customer withdraws money from a brokerage account, the value of the account is reduced
by the amount withdrawn. Because the decline in value is not caused by the defendant,
the defendant should not be held responsible for this decline."' As the Second Circuit
subsequently recognized when the Rolf case was again before it, the losses suffered by the
plaintiff should be offset by the benefits received by the plaintiff.'"
'" See Arrington v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 651 F.2d 615, 621 (9th Cir. 1981).
105 See GUI., THE BASICS OF 1NVF,STING, 142 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Gut], see also, supra note
24.
106 See GUP, supra note 104, at 142.
1 " See Id.
I" See Id.
109 See Id. at 138.
"° See Arrington v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 651 F.2d 615, 621 (9th Cir.
1981) (loss measurement already includes interest).
ni
"2 'See Rolf II, 570 F.2d at 48-50.
1 " This was pointed out by two case comments. See 83 Dick. L. REv. 175, 181 (1978); 66
GEo.L.J. 1551, 1570-71 (1978).
83 DICK. L. Rev. at 181; 66 GEo.I.J. at 1570-71.
mi See cases cited supra note 10.
16 Rolf v. Blyth, Eastman Dillon & Co„ Inc., 637 F.2d 77, 85-6 (2d Cir. 1980). (Rtrif
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The Second Circuit refined the Rolf II model when the damage award granted by the
district court on remand ("Rolf III") was subsequently appealed.'" On this appeal, ("Rolf
IV") Rolf claimed that the court below erroneously computed his damages by reducing his
damage award by the amount received in settlement from certain defendants without
taking into account the value of the stock surrendered by him in connection with that
settlement." 8
 Rolf also claimed that he was entitled to prejudgment interest The
defendants also appealed the district court's damage award, claiming that the lower court
erroneously declined to grant them credit for the net withdrawals of cash and securities
Rolf had made from his account during the period of the fraud.' 2"
Recognizing that the damages formula articulated in Rolf II overstated the plaintiff's
actual damages"' by reducing the plaintiff's gross economic loss, rather than the original
value of the portfolio, by the percentage of market decline, the Second Circuit in Rolf IV
revised its damages formula. In Roy -
 IV, the court held that the original value of the
plaintiff's portfolio, rather than the plaintiff's gross economic loss, should he reduced by
the percentage decline in the general market.'" The court in Rolf IV set forth the
following formula for calculating damages: First, del ermine the value of the plaintiff's
portfolio when the fraud commenced; then adjust that value by the percentage change in
the appropriate market. indicator, given the nature of the plaintiff's portfolio," 3 during
the period of the fraud; and finally, subtract from this adjusted figure the value of the
stock portfolio at the time the fraud ended.'"
In Ro/PV, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals modified its /?o/p/ model by holding
that the original value of the plaintiff's portfolio, rather than the plaintiff's gross eco-
nomic loss, should be reduced by the percentage of market decline. The court reasoned
that. reducing the plaintiff's economic loss by the percentage of market decline would
allow the plaintiff too great a recovery.' Recognizing that had there been no fraud the
market action would have affected t lie total value of the port folio,"" the court held that.
the value of the original portfolio is the appropriate figure to he reduced by the percent-
age of market decline.' The court did not modify its position taken in Rolf II that.
commissions and interest paid to the broker should he returned to the plaintiff; indeed,
this issue was not presented on appeal." 8 The court did, however, recognize that any
award to the plaintiff should he reduced by any withdrawals of cash or securities made for
the customer's personal use."9
Id. at 84-85.
I" Id. at 80.
'" Id.
1 zold
12 ' Id, at 84.
122 Id_
'" In Rolf IV, the plaintiff argued that the district court erred in using the Standard & Poor's
Low Priced Index. 637 F.2d at 84. The Second Circuit held that the choice of market index was Well





28 The issue of which figure should have been reduced by the percentage of market decline was
also not presented as an issue on appeal. Rather, two law review case continents drew this to the
attention of the court. 637 F.2d at 84. See .cupra note 112.
129 637 F.2d at 86. The court also held that it was error not to award prejudgment interest in the
absence of any showing of unfairness to the defendant. Id. at 87. An award of pre judgment interest
is a mailer of judicial discretion. Blau v. Lehman, 368 U.S. 403, 414 (11162).
July 1984]
	
MEASURING DAMAGES UNDER 105-5 	 853
To illustrate the effect of the Rolf IV damages IM - mula, consider again the hypotheti-
cal case of Mr. Customer. Under the HOPI formula, Mr. Customer would have received
$125,000 in damages.'" Under the Rolf IV formula, Mr. Customer would receive
$105,000 in damages.' 3 '
Although the Rol/ IV damages formula more realistically portrays the plaintiff's
actual damages than did the Rolf II formula, it still overcompensates the plaintiff by
counting commissions and interest twice.' 3 ' Despite this flaw, the theory of damages
reflected in the Rolf IV damages analysis, which recognizes that extrinsic factors can cause
a decline in the value of the plaintiff's account,'" is a logically sound and commendable
approach to the measurement of actual damages in churning and suitability actions
because it more accurately measures a plaintiff's actual damages than do the traditional
quasi-contractual and out of pocket models.
B. Variations on Rolf
Following the example set by the Second Circuit in Rolf II ,I34 other district and circuit
courts have adopted damages formulae that award the plaintiff less than his or her gross
economic loss. These damages formulae indicate that courts have recognized that com-
pensating the defrauded customer for the full amount of trading losses sustained and
commissions paid results in a windfall to the plaintiff.'" Commentators likewise have
suggested alternate approaches to the damages problem that would reflect more accu-
rately the customer's actual damages.'" The met hods of calculation vary and sometimes
remain unstated, 137 nevertheless their goal is the sante — to compensate the plaintiff for
all the losses stemming front defendant's fraud and to avoid making the defendants, in
effect, market insurers.' 38
13' See .5	 notes 94-102 and accompanying text.
"." This figure was calculated i!.; follows; $200,000 (original portfolio value) minus $20,00t)
(percent of market decline) minus $100,000 (ending value of portfolio) plus $10,000 (interest) minus
$10,000 (cash withdrawn by the plaintiff) plus $25,000 (commissions) equals $105,000.
132 See supra notes 104 - 111 and accompanying text.
133 637 F.2d at 84.
13.1 570 F.2d 38 (2d Cir. 1978).
135
 See iqra notes 142-146 and accompanying text discussing the damages formula adopted by
the Fifth Circuit in Miley v. Oppenhiemer & Co., Inc., 637 F,2d 318, 327-28 (5th Gin 1981) and notes
169-171 infra discussing the damages formula adopted by the Ninth Circuit in Arrington v. Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 651 F.2d 615, 621-22 (9th Cir. 1981).
1111 Note, Rule 105-5 Damage Compilation: Application of Financial Theory to Determine Net Economic
Loss, 51 FoRtuTANT L. REv. 838, 864-6 (1983); Rath, Damages in BrokerICustomer Suih, 15 Rev. SEC. Rec.
855, 858 (1982); Brodsky, supra note 11, at 165-66.
137 See, e.g., Mihara v. Dean Witter & Co., lnc., 619 F.2d 814, 826 (9th Cir. 1980). In Mihara,
liability was found on both churning and suitability grounds. Id. at 817. Mihara's account reflected
Trading losses of $46,464 and commission and interest expenses of $18,000. lel. at 818, 826. The jury
awarded the plaintiff $24,600 in actual damages. Id. at 826. The appellate court indicated that the
jury award represented half of all commissions and interest paid and half of the trading losses in the
account, Id. This award was held to be reasonable and not excessive. Id. Although the plaintiff
recovered only a portion of his trading losses, it is unclear what rationale led to the specific amount
awarded.
"8 See, e.g., Miley v. Oppenheimer. & Co., Inc., 637 F.2d 318, 327 (5th Cir. 1981). By taking into
account such factors as market action and by excluding losses on securities purchased at the initiative
of the plaintiff, courts are attempting to exclude from the damages award losses not caused by the
defendant's fraudulent conduct. Arrington v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Feistier & Smith, Inc., 651 F.2d
615, 621-22 (91h Cir. 1981). This effort is in accord wit h 1411)-5 cases which employ a proximate cause
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The Fifth Circuit's decision in Miley v. Oppenheimer & Co., Inc.' 39 illustrates the use of
anot her modified rescissory method of calculating the plaintiff's actual damages. In Miley,
a jury found that the defendants were liable for churning the plaintiff's account.'" The
defendants appealed the finding of liability and the damages award."' The Fifth Circuit
affirmed both the finding of liability and the measure of damages used by the district.
court. 142
 Noting that churning could cause both excess commissions to be paid and
trading losses to he sustained, 14 ' the Fifth Circuit held that a damages formula should
encompass both commissions and trading losses.'" The court rejected the defendant's
argument that the award of both commissions and trading losses resulted in double
recovery for the plaintiff."' The real problem in calculating damages, the court found,
was accurately measuring the amount of trading losses caused by the excessive trading
and unsuitable transactions."' Finding that the district court had used an appropriate
method of calculating damages, the Fifth Circuit approved the district. court's jury
instructions on the measure of damages. Under the Miley approach to the measurement
of damages, the actual damages sustained are calculated using the following formula:
First, determine the amount of the plaintiff's original investment and the resulting
dividends; then, subtract any withdrawals from the account made by the plaintiff; next,
subtract the ending value of the plaintiff's account; and, finally, reduce this amount by
the average percentage decline in the value of the Dow Jones Industrial or Standard and
Poor's index during the relevant period of time.' In addition, the court held that the
plaintiff's interest and commission expenses were properly added to this figure"' to
arrive at the total amount of the plaintiff's actual damages. 149
in Miley, the court reasoned that because the defendant's fraud may have caused the
plaintiff both to pay excess commissions and to sustain trading losses, the victimized
test for determining the damages award. See Huddleston v. Herman & MacLean, 640 F.2d 534, 549
(5th Cir. 1981) aff'd in part, rev'd in part on other grounds, 103 S.Ct. 683 (1983); Oleck v. Fischer [1979
Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)11 96,898 at 95,702 (S.D.N.Y. June 8, 1979), aff'd on other
grounds, 623 F.2d 791, 795 n.8 (2(1 Cir. 1980).
139 637 F.2d 327 (5th Cir. 1981).
"" Id. at 325.
Id.
142 hi .
' 43 Id. at 326.
144 Id.
145 Id.
149 Id. at 327. The court's award of damages for the trading losses due to unsuitable transactions
even though only churning was alleged by the plaintiff indicates that the court assumed that once
churning was established, unsuitable transactions must have been made. While the two violations
often occur in conjunction, unsuitable purchases do not inevitably flow from churning activity. See
Hecht v. Harris, Upham & Co., Inc., 430 F.2d 1202, 1212 (9th Cir. 1970).
147 637 F.2d at 328.
14' Id. at 326.
"9 The jury also awarded plaintiff $100,000 in punitive damages for her state law claim of
breach of fiduciary duty. Id. at 329. Section 28(a) of the Exchange Act, see supra note 8, has been held
to bar the award of punitive damages under Rule 10b-5. See, e.g., Byrnes v. Faulkner, Dawkins &
Sullivan, 550 F.2d 1303, 1313 (2d Cir. 1977); see generally Hirsch & Lewis, Punitive Damage Awards
Under the Federal Securities Acts, 47 NoTRE DAME Law. 72 (1971). Punitive damages may be awarded,
however, under a state law claim which is pendent to a Rule 10b-5 claim. E.g., Coffee v. Permian
Corp., 474 F.2d 1040, 1044 (5th Cir. 1973) ("It is well established that exemplary damages may he
awarded if allowable under state law when a state law violation is joined with the lob-5 complaint."),
cert. denied, 412 U.S. 920 (1973); see generally, Comment, Punitive Damages and the Federal Securities Act:
Recovery Via Pendant Jurisdiction, 47 Muss. L. J. 743 (1976).
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investor should be compensated for both harms.''" The court recognized, however, that
to award full out of pocket recovery to the investor would disregard the ordinary hazards
of the marketplace and, consequently, would exact too high a penalty from the clefen-
dams.''' Its task in assessing damages, the court reasoned, was to estimate how the
investor's portfolio would have fared in the absence of the defendant's misconduct.'"
Adjusting the plaintiff's loss by an appropriate indicator of' market decline, the court
found, was a logical method of estimation."~3
The model approved by the Fifth Circuit for calculating the plaintiff's actual dam-
ages in Miley is similar to the model employed by the Second Circuit in Rolf II . 1" Both
models adjust the plaintiff's gross economic loss by the percentage of market decline
during the period in which the fraud took place.'''' In Miley, however, the court also
included the element of dividends in its damages analysis." In determining the value of
the plaintiff's original portfolio,'" the district court instructed the jury to add divide/1(k
received from the original portfolio to the value of the securities held." The Miley court
affirmed this instruction on appeal without discussing the element of dividends.'"" By
including dividends in the analysis, the district court and the Fifth Circuit presumably
recognized that dividends affect the value of a securities port folio.' 6° Under the approach
to damages calculation approved by the court in Miley, defendants are credited fi r the
dividends generated by the account. By adding the amount of dividends that the plaintiff
would have received front her original investment to the value of the plaintiff's original
portfOlio, however, the district. court insured that the defendants were credited only with
dividends received in excess of those that would have been received even had . t here been
no fraud. For example, if' the plaintiff owned one security which generated $100 in
dividends and the defendant broker purchased an unsuitable security which generated
$50 in dividends, the $50 in dividends received from the unsuitable security would be
credited to the defendants to offset the trading losses sustained on the transaction under
the Miley formula. Under the Miley formula, therefore, defendants are credited with the
dividends that the plaintiff received as a result of the defendant's actions.
To illustrate the effect of the damages formula affirmed in Miles', consider again the
hypothetical case of Mr. Customer. In addition to beginning with a portfolio valued at
" 637 F.2d at 326.
Id. at 327.
'" hi. at 328.
153 Id.
15' Compare Miley, 637 F.2d at 328 with Rolf	 570 F.2d at 49-50.
'" Miley, 637 F.2d at 328: Rolf hr, 570 F.2d at 49-50.
w 637 F.2(1 at 328.
"51 This is analogous to the first step in the Rolf formula. See supra now 94 and accompanying
text.
OH 637 F.2d at 328.
l7.9
"'" Because dividends are received by the brokerage houses and are credited to the customer's
account, they add to the value of the customer's account. The defendant should not have the benefit
of these dividends that would be received on the original portfolio in the absence of the defendant's
conduct. By adding the value of these dividends to the value of the plaintiff's original portfolio, the
defendant is only given credit for the dividends which would not have been received in the abscence
of fraud. Because the value of the original portfolio is the starting point for the determination of
damages, inflating that value by the amount of dividends that would be received on the original
security portfolio offsets the increased value to the enduring portfolio value by this amount. See
Arrington v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 651 F.2d 615, 621 (9th Cir. 1981).
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$200,000 assume that this port Folio would have generated $15,000 in dividends if left
intact during the period of the fraud. Assume further that during the period of the fraud
Mr. Customer actually received $20,000 in dividends, which were credited to his account.
Under the Rolf H model, Mr, Customer would have received $125,000 in damages.'"
Under the Roll IV model, Mr.Customer would have received $105,000 in damages."2
Under the Miley formula, Mr. Customer would receive $128,500 in damages." 3 Thus,
under the Milev formula, N1r. Customer would receive more than he would under either
the Roil /1 or Roll iv models and more than the total amount of trading losses in the
account, despite the reduction for market decline and the credit of excess dividends to the
defendant. This result occurs because the plaintiff's gross economic loss, rather than the
value of the original portfolio, is reduced by the market decline.
A comparison of the results reached under the Miley formula with those reached
under the Rolf ti and Rapt,
 models highlights the weaknesses of the Miley approach to
the measurement of damages in churning and suitability actions. Although the inclusion
of dividends adds to the accu racy of the damages award,'"4 the Miley formula is beset with
the sante weaknesses that the Rolf / formula had and which led the Second Circuit to
revise its original formula in Roy. w .185 First, the original value of the plaintiff's account,
not the value after it had been reduced by the plaintiff's withdrawals and the ending value
of the account, should he reduced by the percentage decline in the appropriate market
index.'" Second, commissions and interest should not be counted twice.'" Despite its
flaws, the Miley model does represent a valid attempt to reduce the amount awarded in
damages from the plaintiff's gross economic loss. In addition, the M i ey model, unlike its
predecessors, recognizes that the element of dividends should be taken into account in
any damages formula used in a churning or suitability suit.'" 8
C. The Arrington Model
"The Ninth Circuit's decision in .4 rringion a. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith
represents another attempt by the judiciary to overcome the problems of the traditional
quasi-contractual and out of pocket models of recovery, In Arrington, the plaintiffs, at
their own initiative, opened a brokerage account with the defendants and invested
$280,000 in Western Airlines securities.' The defendant broker, without explaining the
risks, suggested to the plaintiffs that they open a margin account and purchase on the
margin additional securities which he recommended to them.' The plaintiffs followed
'"' See supra note 102 and accompanying text.
'"2 See .supra note 13l and aCCOMpanying text.
"3
 This figure was calculated as follows: $215,000 (original value of portfolio and dividends)
minus $10.000 (cash withdrawals) minus $100,000 (ending portfolio value) minus $11,500 (percent-
age of market decline) plus $25,000 (commissions) plus $10,000 (interest) equals $128,500.
164 hi
See Roll IV, 637 F.2d at 84-86.
1 " Id. at 84.
1 " 7 See Arrington v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 651 F.2d 615, 622 (9th Cir.
1981).
'"" Miley, 637 F.2d at 328.
I"
 651 F.2d 615 (9th Cir. 1981).
1711
 Id. at 618.
' 71 Id. Although Arrington was decided as a misrepresentation and omission case rather than as
suitability or churning case, the gravamen of plaintiffs' claim was that they were fraudulently
induced to purchase speculative securities on the margin, activities which were unsuitable for them.
Id. at 617, 619. Thus, the analysis is conceptually similar to a case alleging unsuitability.
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this advice.'" At their own initiative and without. any advice by the defendant broker, the
plaintiffs also purchased an additional thousand shares of Western Airlines securities on
the margin.'" The plaintiffs suffered a substantial loss on their investments in Western
Airlines securities as a result of the stock market "crash" of 1974. 1  Upon realizing the
extent of their loss, they instituted suit against the defendant broker and brokerage
firm.'" The defendants were found liable for fraudulently inducing the plaintiffs to
convert their cash account into a margin account and to invest in speculative securities
without informing them of the risks inherent in such transactions.'"
The district court determined the plaintiffs' damages by imputing a sale of the
margin stocks on the date that the plaintiffs should have discovered the fraud.'" From
this figure, the court subtracted the amount the plaintiffs would have received had they
sold their margin securities from their margin balance on that date.'" The court further
reduced this amount by that portion of the margin debt attributed to the unsolicited
purchase of one thousand shares of Western Airlines. 17" The method of calculating
damages used by the district court is represented by the following formula: First, deter-
mine the margin debt at. the time the fraud was, or should have been, discovered; then,
subtract the value of the margin stock at the time of the discovery of the fraud; and
finally, subtract the price of any margin security for which the defendants were not.
responsible.'"
By focusing only on the speculative margin stock the defendants fraudulently in-
duced the plaintiffs to purchase rather than on the entire portfolio, the court was able to
factor out the market decline of the original portfolio without the need of a market
indicator."' Because the only securities purchased as a result of the defendant's fraud
were still in the account when the fraud was discovered, the court. was able to determine
1 72
 Id. at 618.
I -73
"'Id. at 617.
j75 Id. at 619.
'" hi. at 617.
'" Id. at 620. The district court determined that the plaintiffs should have discovered the fraud
on the date that they received their first margin call. Id. at 620. On appeal, the plaintiffs argued that
choosing this date as the damages cut off date was erroneous because the defendants perpetrated
their fraud after this date. Id. In rejecting this argument, the court noted that ordinary mitigation
principles are applicable in 10b-5 cases and held that, "Plaintiff's tlannqces in a 10b-5 case arc limited
by what they would have realized bad they acted to preserve their assets or rights when they first
learned of the fraud or had reason to know of it." Id.
"g Id. at 621.
179 Id. The method employed in Arrington is similar to the approach taken by the Seventh Circuit
in Fey v. Walston & Co„ 493 F.2d 1036 (7th Cit . . 1974). In Fey, the court distinguished between
trading losses on stock purchases initiated by the customer and those initiated by the broker. The
Seventh Circuit held that since the losses on the transactions the customer initiated occurred
independently of the broker's conduct, these transactions Could not be "lumped in for the jury's
consideration without at least affording some guide by which they can be eliminated from considera-
tion upon a determination that, indeed, the defendants had nothing to do with them. - Id. at 1055.
'" Arlington, 651 F.2d at 621.
Ill Since the court was able to determine with precision what securities would have been in
plaintiff's account if there had been no fraud, the decline in the value of plaintiff's account
attributable directly to market depreciation was easily ascertainable. Where it is impossible to know in
what condition the plaintiff's portfolio would have been had there been no fraud, a court must use a
market indicator to approximate the impact market depreciation has cm the account. See RnIPI, 570
F.2d at 49 n.22.
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the exact amount of the losses attributable to the defendants' actions. The court deter-
mined the plaintiff's' actual damages by focusing only on the speculative margin stocks in
the account rather than on the entire portfolio. Having determined what the exact nature
of the account would have been had there been no fraud, the court could then compare
the value of the properly managed account with its actual value to arrive at the actual
damages caused by the defendants' fraud.'"
On appeal, the plaintiffs argued that they were entitled to recover all of the losses in
their account, with no deduction for the losses attributable to general market decline.' 83
The Ninth Circuit rejected this argument, reasoning that had there been no fraud, the
plaintiffs would have owned all of the securities in their account that they purchased at
their own initiative.'" The decline in the market value of these securities was, therefore,
not caused by the defendants, according to the court.'" The damages caused by the
defendants acts consisted only of the difference between what the plaintiffs would have
had if they had purchased only the securities bought at their own initiative and what they
in fact had in their account.." 6
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the appropriateness of the theory of damages used by the
district court, finding error only in the district court's treatment of the dividend activity in
the plaintiffs' account. 1H7
 Like the Roll models,'" the district court's model of damages did
not make any special provision for the treatment of dividends. Finding that this omission
was error, the Ninth Circuit held that the plaintiffs were entitled to credit for the cash
dividends paid on the original stocks and applied against the margin debt. 1 B 8 This
treatment of dividend activity is analytically consistent with the treatment. of dividends in
the formula used by the court in M ley .'" The dividends attributable to the plaintiffs'
original portfolio are credited to the plaintiffs' original account value."' The defendants,
therefore, receive credit for only the dividends received as a result of the additional
activity in the account."'
In Arrington, the Ninth Circuit rejected the plaintiffs' argument that they were
entitled to the return of interest paid in addition to the trading losses associated with the
fraudulently purchased margin stock.'" The court reasoned that "plaintiffs' formula
would compensate (hem twice for the interest accrued on the margin debt, since these
charges were simply added to the debt . . . and are already included in the [plaintiffs']
losses'."'" Similarly, although the Arrington court did not address the element of commis-
sions, the commissions paid by the plaintiff' were not added to the trading loss figure.'"
' 82 Because the exact tunount of damages could be calculated, it was not necessary for the court
to use a market indicator to estimate the decline in value of the plaintiff's port Folio not caused by the
defendant's fraud,
"3 651 F.2d at 620.




' 88 See supra notes 94-97 and notes 123-24 and accompanying text.
' 89 651 F.2d at 621.
' 9' 1 637 F.2d at 328.
un 651 F.2d at 621.
'"2 See supra, note 160.
' 651 F.2d at 622.
194 Id.
Id. Commission charges, like interest expenses, are charged against the account and are
incorporated in the reduced ending value of the account. See supra note 24•
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The hypothetical case of Mr. Customer illustrates the effect of the Airington model of
calculating damages. Continue to assume that 11te original value of Mr. Customer's
portfolio is $200,000 and that he received $15,000 in dividends on the securities in this
portfolio. Assume also that the ending value of his portfolio is $100,000, consisting of
$200,000 of margin debt, $120,000 in the value of margined securities, and $180,000 in
the value of the original port folio. Assume further that Mr. Customer actually received
$20,000 in dividends, that he withdrew $10,000 in cash for his own use, and that his
account generated $25,000 in commissions and $10,000 in interest. In contrast to the Rolf
Iv model, under which Mr. Customer would receive $105,000 in damages, 1 °' t and the
Afitey model, under which Mr. Customer would receive $128,500 in damages,' 9  under the
Arrington model Mr. Customer would receive $85,000 in damages.'"
The Arrington model has several advantages over both the traditional models of
recovery and the modified models developed by the Second Circuit in Ho/p/ ' 98 and Rolf
11/ 2" and the Fifth Circuit in Miley.' First, in the hypothetical case of Mr, Customer, the
Arrington model is the only formula under which Mr. Customer would receive less than
his total out of" pocket loss, a result the Rolf and Miley courts reasoned was necessary to
prevent the plaintiff from receiving a windfall:2 °2 The Arrington approach is the only
modified rescissory model to compensate the plaintiff for only that portion of his losses
proximately caused by the defendant's conduct and not for kisses caused by other factors
such as market decline. Second, by recognizing that commissions and interest charges
are debited to the account. and are reflected in the reduced ending balance of the account,
and by refusing to add commission and interest charges to the trading loss figure, the
Arrington model avoids counting commissions and interest twice.'"'` The Arrington model
logically accounts for all items affecting a customer's account, including dividends, market
decline,'" commissions, interest and cash withdrawals. It is, therefore, a logically sound
approach to determining the plaintiff's actual damages. As such, it should serve as a
model for courts faced with suits between customers and brokers in the future.
Ill. A PRorosco MODEL
The goal of any model for calculating damages in a suit for churning or suitability
violations is to place the defrauded customer in the same position he would have occupied
had there been no fraud.'"' Given the complex nat ure of the average brokerage ac-
3 ' See Supra note 131 and accompanying text.
See Anpra note 163 and accompanying text.
'Ibis figure was calculated as follows: $200,000 (margin debt) minus $120,000 (ending value
of marginal securities) plus $15,000 (dividends received on original portfolio) minus $10,000 (cash
withdrawals) equals $85,000.
1 " 570 F.2d 38 (2d Cir. 1978).
"" 637 F.2d 77 (2d Cir. 1984)).
637 F.2d 318 (5th Cir. 1981).
202 Ruff If, 570 F.2d at 49 n.22; Miley v. Oppenheimer & Co., Inc., 637 F.2(1 at 328.
2 ' 651 F.2d at 622.
2°4 Although Arrington did non explicitly deal with the factor of general market decline, compar-
ing the value of the plaintiff's account as it would have been without the defendant's fraud with the
value of the account as it actually existed, the Arrington court effectively factored in the market
decline on the plaintiff's original portfolio without the need for the use of a market indicator. See 651
F.2d at 621.
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count,'" any damages formula used must take into account more than commissions paid
or trading losses sustained. The traditional quasi-contractual model, which focuses only
on commissions and interest paid,'" and the traditional out of pocket model, which takes
into account only trading losses sustained, 208
 arc ill-suited to most suits between customers
and brokers because they do not take into account many of the factors that influence the
value of a securities account. A more complex model for measuring damages, which
incorporates as many of the variables that affect a customer's account as possible, should
be used in these suits. This section will first discuss the contributions made to the analysis
of damages by the recent modified rescissory approaches adopted by various circuits.
Next, a proposed model, which incorporates many of the contributions made by these
recent approaches, will he suggested. This note submits that this proposed model is more
consistent with the goal of measuring the plaintiff's actual damages than previous models
because it incorporates many of the variables affecting the value of the account without.
counting any single component of the plaintiff's damages twice. Because this model
incorporates most of the variables that may affect the value of a customer's portfolio, it
applies to most of the factual situations likely to arise in the context of any suit between a
customer and a broker.
The first court to go beyond the traditional models of recovery was the Second
Circuit in /?o/f//. 2 °9 In Ralf II the court recognized that market action affects the value of
an account regardless of the fraudulent acts of the defendant."" Market action, the court
held, should, therefore, be incorporated into the damages formula used.'" The court in
Ralf II reasoned that reducing the original value of the plaintiff's account by the percent-
age of market decline would reflect more accurately the value of the account absent the
fraud than would the traditional approach of using only the original value of the
account.!" Subsequently, the Second Circuit in Rolf !V, recognized that any award to the
plaintiff should he reduced by any withdrawals of cash or securities made for the
customer's own use. 213 The Rog . // and Roil IV decisions added two elements to the
traditional models of recovery that are properly incorporated into any damages formula
— market action and withdrawals made by the customer for personal consumption. 214
In Miley,' the Fifth Circuit incorporated the element of dividends into the calcula-
tion of the damages caused by the defendant's fraudulent acts. The Miley court held that
the dividends received front the securities in the original portfolio should be added to the
value of the original portfolio. 2 i" As the Miley court recognized, all dividends received in
an account. are credited to the account and, consequently, affect its ending value. 217 By
adding the amount of dividends that would have been received from the securities in the
Commissions, interest, dividends, cash withdrawals and deposits, as well as market action all
affect the value of a brokerage account.
207 See, supra notes 32-33 and accompanying text.
2"" See, supra notes 53-54 and accompanying text.
'a" 570 F.2d 38. See supra notes 89-133 and accompanying text.
2 " Id. at 49.
21"
2 " Id. at 49 n.22,
2 " 637 F.2d at 86.
2 " Id. at 84 - 86.
215
 637 F.2d 318 (5th Cir. 1981).
216
 Id. at 328.
217 id.
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original portfolio to the value of the original port folio, the court insured that the damages
formula credits the defendant with only the dividends received in excess of those that
would have been received in the absence of the defendant's fraud. The Miley court
contributed the additional element of dividend activit.y to the analysis of the measure of
damages in suits between customers and brokers:2 ' 8
In Arrington," the Ninth Circuit added another dimension to the damages analysis
by recognizing that fees charged by the brokerage house, such as interest. are routinely
debited to the plaintiff's account. 22" The Arrinom court reasoned that because these fees
are debited to the account, they are reflected in the reduced ending value of the account
and should not be a separate item of the plaintiff's damages."' Before the Arrington
decision, courts added fees charged by the brokerage house, such as commissions and
interest, to the difference between the value of' the original and ending values of the
account to arrive at the ultimate damages figure. 222 By recognizing the need to avoid
counting fees charged by the brokerage house twice in measuring damages, the Arrington
court contributed another necessary feature to the damage analysis in suits between
customer and brokers.
Accepting the reasoning of the Second Circuit in Ro/f," 3 the Fifth Circuit ill Mitet, 224
and the Ninth Circuit in Arrington , 2'  that any damages formula used in a suit bet ween a
broker and customer should incorporate the following elements: the original value of the
account, the value of the account. on the date the fraud was, or should have been
discovered, market action, dividend activity, and cash withdrawals and deposits made by
the customer. With these elements in mind, the following formula is suggested for
calculating damages in suits between customers and brokers: First, determine the value of
the portfolio at the time the fraud commenced; then, add the amount of dividends which
either were received, or would have been received, in the account on the securities in the
original portfolio; next, reduce this value by the percentage decline or increase this figure
by the value of percentage increase, using the appropriate market indicator, given the
nature of the plaintiff's portfolio; next, subtract the value of the plaintiff's portfolio at the
time the fraud wits, or should have been, discovered; then, subtract. any withdrawals of
cash or securities from the account made by the plaintiff; and finally, add any deposits of
cash or securities to the account made by the plaintiff.
This proposed model is designed to cover the vast majority of suits between custom-
ers and brokers for churning, suitability, or both. The goal of this model is to return the
customer to the position that he would have been in had there been no fraud. By
adjusting the plaintiff's out of pocket loss by the percentage decline in the market in
general and by refusing to add commissions and interest to the adjusted trading loss
figure, this formula is designed to compensate the plaintiff fully and to avoid having
defendants reap the profits of their fraud. The proposed model accomplishes this goal




219 651 F.2d 615 (9th Cir. 1981).
"" Id. at 622.
'2 ' Id.
22' See, e.g., 637 F.2d at 326.
"3 570 F.2d 38 (2d Cir. 1978); 637 F.2d 77 (2d Cir. 1980).
224 637 F.2d 318 (5th Cir. 1981).
"5 651 F.2d 615 (9th Cir. 1981).
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Application of this proposed formula is intended to extend beyond the traditional
factual setting of a decline in value of the customer's account during a period of market
decline. If the market rose during the period of the fraud, for example, the value of the
customer's original account would be increased by the percentage of market appreciation.
Use of the proposed formula in a period of market appreciation recognizes t hat in the
absence of fraud, the value of the original portfolio would increase during a period of
market appreciation just as the value of the original account would decrease during a
period of general market decline. Because no case has been presented where the market.
rose during the period of the fraud, no court has explicitly recognized the need to factor
in market appreciation in a damages formula. The same reasoning which led courts to
include market decline in the damages analysis, however, mandates the inclusion of
market appreciation in the damages analysis during a period of market appreciation as
well. Only when the general market has remained steady during the period of the fraud
should market action be excluded from the damages analysis. A steady market would
indicate that the value of the original portfolio would also have remained steady in the
absence of the defendant's fraud, and, therefore, no adjustment to that value is necessary.
The plaintiff customer should be compensated for the actual harm caused by the
defendant's acts rather than out of pocket loss sustained by the plaintiff. The proposed
model is designed to achieve this result. Under the proposed model, if the defendant's
acts did not cause the loss, for example, if the total decline in the value of the account were
clue to market action, the plaintiff' would recover nothing even though there was a loss in
the value of his account. Such a result is correct because the decline in value was caused by
market activity and not by the defendant's actions. The proposed model, however, does
permit a plaintiff -
 to recover damages even if his or her account has not declined in value.
For example, if' the plaintiff's original portfolio consisted of high-yield securities and the
defendant had fraudulently induced the plaintiff to purchase low-yield securities, the
plaintiff would receive the lost dividends even if the account had not declined in value.
The proposed model, which incorporates the contributions to the calculation of
damages made by the Second Circuit in Rolf,'" the Filth Circuit itt Miie7 227 and t he Ninth
Circuit in Arringtott,"" is an appropriate model of damages for most suits between
customers and brokers. Under the proposed model, the plaintiff is compensated for the
actual harm caused by the defendant's fraud, whether that harm is in the form of trading
losses, lost. dividends, or, during a period of market appreciation, lost participation in the
appreciation. The defendant, however, is not held liable for harm not caused by his or her
acts, such as loss clue to market decline. Similarly, under the proposed t ►oclel, the
defendant is not charged for the same harm, such as commissions and interest, more than
once. The proposed model, therefore, represents a logical approach to the calculation of
damages in a churning or suitability case.
CONCLUSION'
A review of the churning and suitability cases that have gone to judgment indicates
that damages in these cases are not easily computed. 229 Decisions in this area are the
2" 570 F.2d 38 (2d Cir. 1978); 637 F.2d 77 (2d Cir. 1980).
2Y7 637 F.2d 318 (5th Cir. 1981).
"" 651 F.2d 615 (9th Cir. 1981).
229 See Miley v. Oppenheimer & Co., Inc., 637 F.2d 318, 327 (5th Cir. 1981)(in which the Fifth
Circuit noted that the real problem with compensating the victimized investor is "the difficulty in
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subject of varying and sometimes conflicting legal analysis. 23" Recently, however, courts
have begun to appreciate the number of factors that must be taken into account in
computing a fair measure of damages and have attempted to devise models which look to
more than a customer's trading losses and a broker's commissions. Undoubtedly, plain=
tiffs will continue to argue for the model of recovery which results in the greatest
recovery, usually the pure rescissory model, and defendants will continue to argue for the
model of recovery which results in the least amount of damages, usually the pure
quasi-contractual model. Trial courts today, however, may be more inclined to adopt an
established modified rescissory model of recovery that incorporates extrinsic factors, such
as market action, or to devise a model of their own. The model proposed by this note
incorporates market action, dividend activity, cash withdrawals and deposits, as well as the
traditional elements of commissions and trading losses in its calculation of the actual
damages sustained. The proposed model is a viable alternative to the traditional and
modified formulae previously approved by courts because it corrects some of the flaws in
the previous models and attempts to avoid a windfall for either party from the damages
award.
TRACY A. MINER
accurately measuring the loss in portfolio value proximately caused by the excessive trading and
unsuitable transactions.").
2" See Fey v. Walston & Co., Inc., 493 F.2d 1036,1055 n.26 (1974)(in which the Seventh Circuit
noted that, "the law in this area remains largely uncharted.")
